Why Societies Need Dissent by Cass Sunstein

Source of book: I own this.

I recently read an article pointing out a number of ideas that either were supported by the Republican party or probably would have been but for one thing: President Obama publicly supported them, thus making them anathema. (The most obvious of these was the payroll tax cut, which was fine under G.W. Bush, but then opposed after Obama supported it. There are plenty of others.) This is one of the reasons I just can’t take politics these days. 

Another victim of this tribalism is, in my opinion, Cass Sunstein. I really wasn’t aware of his books until President Obama nominated him for the delightfully named Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. (It is hard to imagine a better bureaucratic name. I mean, it could be the name for just about anything.) At that time, a certain group of conservatives, largely centered around the talk radio circuit, went ballistic, accusing him of all kinds of crazy political and legal positions. One would have thought he was the reincarnation of Marx.

But, it turns out, he really wasn’t and isn’t any of those things, but rather, a thoughtful law professor with plenty of ideas that should appeal to conservatives. But, the friend of my enemy is my enemy, I guess.

I reviewed Nudge last year, and found it intriguing, not the least because it seemed to present an interesting alternative to heavy handed government regulation and control to protect average people from a variety of ills, from difficulty in saving for retirement to vulnerability to scammers. Sunstein called his idea “libertarian paternalism,” and it left individual choice in place while making the “default settings” of society more likely to lead to good results. To me, this seemed a natural idea for a conservative (like myself) to embrace, as it didn’t limit choices. Rather, it allowed the natural human inertia and difficulty in making intimidating decisions to work toward safer, better results. It lowered the difficulty level for the average person, particularly those with less education, familiarity with financial systems, and less free time on their hands.

The conservative response to this idea baffled me. The two possible explanations seemed to be either that they really, truly and deeply, wanted most people to fail (and some I suspect do hold this view) or that they rejected it out of hand because Obama supported it.

Sunstein also skews conservative on a few other issues, including support for the death penalty, advocacy for judicial restraint (and the related support for Chief Justice John Roberts), and support for military tribunals. Even libertarians might like his belief that the government should stop regulating marriage, replacing them with civil unions. He also has some more traditionally liberal views, such as support for limited affirmative action, and a view of taxation as a necessary good rather than evil. His unwavering support for free speech rights, which are central to this particular book doesn’t favor either side, as I will note.

So I don’t get it. His views seem pretty moderate on average, hardly ideologically driven. If anything, he works hard to consider a variety of arguments and even discuss the potential weaknesses of his point of view. Really, the ideal of how a lawyer - or judge - should approach things.

I also want to mention a concept that Sunstein pioneered which gets a quick mention in this book, but should be a required concept for all students, in my opinion. Sunstein calls it an “availability cascade,” but what it really describes is the tendencies that lead to things such as a fear of flying despite the low relative risks. It is the desire to find a single explanation for complex issues, and to overvalue certain unlikely risks over other, much more serious and widespread risks. More on this later. 

The central theme of Why Societies Need Dissent is that if dissent is suppressed, either by governmental or societal forces, necessary information that prevents errors is never considered. As a result, societies that fail to value and listen to dissent are more prone to fatal errors than those who encourage a variety of voices.

Now, dissenting ideas themselves are neutral. Some ideas are objectively ludicrous, such as the opinion that the sun revolves around the earth. But many more are in gray areas. There is no one objectively right answer, and it is important that multiple perspectives be considered so that errors do not compound by being unopposed. Sunstein proceeds to flesh out these ideas, and tease out, using a number of studies, the ways that groups act with and without a healthy dissent.

There are two particular reasons that I connected with this research. First, there is a whole chapter on the dynamics of three judge appellate panels. As a lawyer, this was fascinating on so many levels. (For example, did you know that a Democratic appointee on a panel with two Republican appointees tends to vote slightly more conservative than a Republican appointee on a panel with two Democrats? Sunstein has a ton of research demonstrating this.)

The other hits even more close to home. Why do cults tend to go from normal to crazy so fast? How do groups of seemingly normal people start espousing positions far more extreme than any of them would by themselves? (In my own life, how do normal decent people decide to silence women, keep their kids out of college, and make their kids dress like Victorians?)

To start at the beginning, Sunstein looks at two countervailing forces. “Ideological amplification” versus “ideological dampening.” If a group of people generally share the same ideas, they will tend to get more extreme, while those groups who have differing ideas will tend to moderate the more extreme ideas.

The most amazing facet of ideological amplification is that if a group of “likeminded” persons talk only among themselves, they tend to come to conclusions that are far more extreme than any of the individuals espoused before they deliberated as a group.

Here is an interesting twist: the way that individuals identify themselves and others as part of the majority group or not influences this dynamic. If all the individuals strongly identify with each other, they tend to suppress their own dissent in order to further group solidarity. This also occurs where the dissenter is identified as an outsider - his view can be safely ignored. The ideal balance appears to be where all members are loosely part of the group, but not so close to the group that they would sacrifice their views for peace. The worst, therefore, is when there is an “us versus them” dynamic, either the group against every other view, or a polarization of the viewpoints within the group.

This tendency to follow one’s own group is chillingly seen in experiments in which volunteers “punish” other volunteers with electric shocks for wrong answers. Monolithic groups tended to cause far greater shocks, particularly when they believed planted “experts” on the benefit of administering these shocks. Sunstein noted that this tendency is seen where people are far more willing to cause pain and destruction to others if they believe (and their friends believe) that it is for the good of society, such as in imposing draconian jail terms for drug offenders.

I noted above the “availability cascades.” Cascades in general tend to occur when one person expresses an opinion, thus influencing the others to keep silent. One highly confident person can thus impose his will on others who lack the confidence of their opinions. This is particularly apparent in fear of risk, as noted above. If one person starts a fear, then the others join in, not because they have actually researched the risk, but because they believe the original person. Probably one of the greatest modern examples is that of food fears, whether fear of pesticides or GMOs, or whatever. Nearly nobody actually looks at the research on the risks, or considers actual evidence (such as a declining cancer incidence rate). Rather, fear feeds on fear, and facebook post feeds on facebook post.

And yet, despite a notable lack of evidence that there is significant risk of harm, the paranoia continues.

Now, what is amazing about this is that there are serious, known risks out there. In fact, there are two big things one can do that have far more effect on one’s health than any of these scares. What are they? Number one: quit smoking. Number two: exercise strenuously four times a week.

And yet, most - not all but most - of the people I know who are continuously posting food scare articles (or anti-vaccine articles for that matter) don’t exercise regularly. And many are overweight or obese. Ignoring the real risk for the fake one.

How does this occur? Sunstein points to “reputational pressure.” If a mom, for example, doesn’t agree with the fears of her peer group, she is considered a neglectful mother. It’s far easier to just go along with the fear de jour. This is one of the most serious problems within “likeminded” groups. Weird beliefs persist because to question them would mean a loss of reputation.

This is the major reason that Sunstein worries (as do I) about the current state of free speech. There seems to be an increasing tendency toward self segregation in the ideological sense (and in the racial sense, for that matter.) We tend to live in neighborhoods and shop at stores and worship in churches with people who largely share our demographics and our ideas. As Sunstein puts it, “many people show a desire to live in echo chambers of their own devising.”

I must mention in this connection that the entire chapter six, entitle “The Law of Group Polarization” is excellent. It explores the dynamics of terrorism, street gangs, cults, and even arguably more benign groups such as political parties and religious organizations. Just as terrorists do not even consider that competing views have merit, and thus devolve into extremism, groups of all sorts are prone to place competing views in the category of “them.” That is, our enemies. People whose opinions (and dissent) don’t matter. Thus, dissenters are either silenced or driven from the group, and their counterbalancing ideas are never considered.

Finally, Sunstein notes that it isn’t enough just for ideas to be out there in the ether. Ideas are most effective when they are associated with people. Thus, it is one thing for a group of middle class white people to discuss racial profiling, but it is another altogether to hear an African American friend describe his or her experiences.

But the value of diversity does not lie simply in learning facts. Much of it comes from seeing a range of perspectives, including the emotions attached to them - and from being in the actual presence of people who have those perspectives and cannot be easily dismissed.

Note on “likeminded”:

I use that term for two reasons. First, Sunstein uses it. Second, it is a significant buzzword in both homeschool and patriarchal circles. The idea is that one should only fellowship with people who think the same way. And certainly, one’s children should only be exposed to people who think the same way. As Sunstein shows, this is a recipe for disaster. It is also a hallmark of terrorist groups and cults.

This comes from the Presuppositionalism from the Van Til and Rushdoony underpinnings, which teach the idea that only those with the same narrow religious beliefs can even arrive at any truth. Opinions from outside of the orthodoxy thus cannot - by definition - be true, and can thus be discounted. With the insistence that women remain silent and out of leadership, this reduces the source of acceptable opinions to a small group of men who hold certain beliefs, and anyone outside of that small circle is automatically ignored or actively fought against. Hmm, what could possibly go wrong?

Nudge by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein

Source of book: Borrowed from the library


First of all, I must state that my wife is a hypocrite. It’s true. But first, let me explain what this fascinating book is about. 


Thaler is an economist, while Sunstein is a lawyer, but was appointed to serve in the Obama administration. Their book, published before the election, addresses the question of default settings in public policy, and the use of what they call “nudges” to assist people in making good decisions. 


Thaler and Sunstein advocate a position they call “libertarian paternalism.” At the heart of this concept is the idea of a default setting - that is, what happens when people do not take action. A great example of this is the 401(k) retirement account. In order to start contributing to such an account, one must take action by signing up. In addition, one must choose which investments are used. The default setting at this time is “no contributions,” which is surely a poor default. This is doubly (or more) so, in cases where an employer matches contributions. The default is to lose free money!


There are other possible defaults here, including a default that 401(k) contributions are set at the maximum, or that they are set at the level of the maximum employer match. Another possibility is that the employee be forced to explicitly choose before he or she receives the first paycheck. The result of the current default is that nearly everyone says they want to contribute more, but far too many never overcome the inertia and sign up. 


A related problem is that of choosing investments. Most plans have numerous funds as options, and most investors are fairly unsophisticated when it comes to choosing them. Most of us would prefer some guidance to appropriate investments. (I am an exception here: I love doing the research, and educated myself before opening my own SEP IRA accounts.) The point here is that it suddenly becomes extremely important to set appropriate defaults. As the authors point out, something will be the default: it is impossible to avoid it. Space prevents the discussion of the Swedish social security system. (Yes, it’s true. The socialist Swedes have partially privatized their social security system.) The authors’ look at the results of various defaults tried by the Swedish government over the last decade is illustrative of the power of the default setting.

Now this is where my wife is a hypocrite. She has generally been purely libertarian in her philosophy toward retirement contributions - far more libertarian than me. Although she does contribute to her retirement at the matching rate, she set her accounts essentially at the default, and cannot really explain what she has invested in and why. She has accepted the defaults, and many others are like her. (I mean nothing negative here - it's just human nature - but many libertarians seem intent on denying or ignoring this fact.)


Here is where Thaler and Sunstein believe in the use of “nudges.” These are essentially the use of defaults and reminders in ways that do not abridge the freedom of choice, but assist those who tend to settle for defaults in making better decisions. In order to qualify as a nudge, the authors believe that the cost of overriding the nudge should be as low as possible - preferably zero. In the above example, if the default for retirement contributions was, say, five percent of income, it would qualify as a nudge as long as the employee could easily opt out. (The change would be from “opt-in” to “opt-out.”) 


Central to the idea of the “nudge” is that people are “humans” rather than “econs.” The typical libertarian economist believes that people always educate themselves, consider the options, and pick what they want. In other words, they make decisions that are in their best interest. People like this exist, and the authors call them “econs.” Most of us, however, are “humans” in how we behave. We fail to act logically in all situations. We procrastinate, and react rather than think - at least in some cases. We are particularly prone to get into trouble on serious issues wherein the cost is incurred immediately, but the reward is in the future. We struggle to get complex issues correct, which is a particular problem in cases where we do not get the opportunity to practice, such as in saving for retirement. These are the precise scenarios where the authors think that nudges can be helpful. 


A great example of the “human” tendency can be seen in an experiment involving intentionally stale popcorn, which was served in different sized containers. It was rather universally agreed among the participants that the popcorn was gross, and yet those with larger containers ate more. By a lot. Even though they hated the popcorn. 


Another interesting “human” tendency was to have difficulty assessing risk. For example, most people will estimate the likelihood of divorce to be fifty percent - at least for other people. For themselves, they consistently estimate a zero chance. Obviously, this cannot be right, but the human tendency is to disregard certain risks and overestimate others. (This could be an entire book by itself.) 


Another reason the authors think nudges are important is that humans tend to follow the herd. We naturally want to do what we believe other people are doing. By shifting the default, the herd mentality can be used to produce better results. The authors cite the Jamestown Massacre as a negative example, but also note that the herd mentality has also been used to reduce littering. This part of the discussion was seriously unsettling, particularly the experiments that have been done involving peer pressure. People are amazingly unwilling to stand for their own opinions if they have to do so against a crowd. On the positive side, it was shown that consistent and unwavering people can have immense influence for good, as well as evil. 


Libertarians, of course, tend to oppose nudges, for a number of reasons, some better than others. The authors are proposing what they believe is a third way, between the “command and control” paradigm of modern, post Franklin Roosevelt liberalism; and the laissez faire approach of libertarian conservatism. The authors correctly note that many companies and individuals have a strong financial incentive to cater to people’s ignorance and frailties and exploit them. A good example cited here is the mortgage business, where fine print and complexity are routinely used to hide the true cost from consumers. 


The goal that the authors set is to determine how to use nudges, rather than command and control schemes to protect the less sophisticated and the vulnerable. The intention is to benefit the “humans”, with a minimal cost to the “econs.” In the context of retirement, there should be a miniscule cost - if any - to a default that leads to a greater investment in retirement by those who fail, for whatever reason, to go beyond the default. It should not bother those of us who actively manage our retirement accounts if someone else also does well. If it does, perhaps we should be evaluating why we wish to see others hurt. Do we just want to look down on others we deem less intelligent than ourselves? Something to ponder. 


I felt that the authors made their point well, and present a powerful argument in favor of libertarian paternalism. It is with regret that I note that, despite Sunstein’s presence, the Obama administration has chosen in most cases to go with a command and control approach, rather than a “freedom and nudge” approach as that advocated by the authors. I think that the “third way” proposal would be attractive to both sides of the aisle: more protection against our frailties (and from exploitation), combined with greater freedom of choice - and from onerous regulatory compliance. 


Note on some specific proposals: The authors address a few ideas, such as the use of a carbon tax or a cap and trade scheme to reduce pollution. They contrast it, however, with a command and control scheme, in which byzantine or draconian regulations cause costs to both those who pollute and those who comply. They also come down in favor of school vouchers, as increasing freedom, while setting defaults so that it is harder for the more sophisticated to game the system. They also advocate for privatizing marriage. All of these proposals are worth considering, whether you agree with them or not. I thought they were food for thought, and should be considered in contrast to the current state of affairs, not just in the abstract.

Note on peer pressure: A quote from this section made me smile, although it is not directly on point:
 

Conventional wisdom has it that if two people live together for a long time, they start to look like each other. This bit of folk wisdom turns out to be true. (For the curious: they grow to look alike partly because of nutrition - shared diets and eating habits - but much of the effect is simple imitation of facial expressions.) In fact couples who end up looking alike also tend to be happier!

Note on notes: The authors use their own version of a nudge in how they format the notes, which they explain at the outset. Most citations and other notations are presented as endnotes at the back of the book. These are interesting to people like me, who occasionally wish to check a citation source. However, certain other notes, which the authors assume the average reader would like to see immediately, without flipping to the back, are placed as footnotes. I wish more authors did things this way. I hate having to go all the way to the end for a note that can be a useful explanation of the text, but would hate to have all the citations right there and in the way. Brilliantly done!

Note on Shel Silverstein: The authors wished to use Silverstein’s poem “Smart” as an illustration. It was perfectly on point, and charming. Here is how the authors describe what happened: 
 

To analyze the question, let’s start with a simple example inspired by a wonderful poem by Shel Silverstein (1974) entitled “Smart.” The poem is fun as well as brilliant, so if you have a computer nearby, we suggest you type “Smart” and “Shel Silverstein” into Google and read the poem now.* We will wait for you to get back before continuing.

*Silverstein had personally given Thaler permission to use the poem in an academic paper published in 1985 - he said he was tickled to see his work appear in the American Economic Review - but the poem is now controlled by his estate, which after several nudges (otherwise known as desperate pleas), has denied us permission to reprint the poem here. Since we would have been happy to pay royalties, unlike the Web sites you will find via Google, we can only guess that the managers of the estate (to paraphrase the poem) don’t know that some is more than none. 

Since I think I can get away with quoting a single poem under the fair use doctrine, I will reproduce it here.

My dad gave me one dollar bill

'Cause I'm his smartest son,

And I swapped it for two shiny quarters

'Cause two is more than one!

And then I took the quarters

And traded them to Lou

For three times -- I guess he don't know

That three is more than two!

Just then, along came old blind Bates

And just 'cause he can't see

He gave me four nickels for my three dimes,

And four is more than three!

And I took the nickels to Hiram Coombs

Down at the seed-feed store,

And the fool gave me five pennies for them,

And five is more than four!

And then I went and showed my dad,

And he got red in the cheeks

And closed his eyes and shook his head--

Too proud of me to speak!