Source
of book: borrowed from the library
I have
enjoyed Rebecca Solnit’s magazine articles for a number of years, but never
read one of her books. A Paradise Built in Hell is a fascinating look at
one of the narratives many of us believe (or once believed in my case) but
turns out to be total bullshit.
TL;DR
- Thomas Hobbes was wrong. Very wrong.
The
myth: in times of disaster, humans go feral, and it is every man for himself,
marauding gangs, and all that.
The
reality: Most humans pull together during disasters, creating mutual
communities of aid. In fact, ordinary people tend to do better than
organizations at rescuing people, feeding people, and otherwise getting stuff
done.
The
caveat: Along with this cooperation tends to come what Solnit calls “elite
panic.” That is, those who benefit from the status quo feel threatened by their
loss of power and privilege, and tend to do really horrible things. As disaster
sociologist Kathleen Tierney puts it (quoted in the book):
“Elites fear disruption of the social
order, challenges to their legitimacy.”
She
notes the elements of this elite panic are “fear of social disorder; fear of
poor, minorities, and immigrants; obsession with looting and property crime;
willingness to resort to deadly force; and actions taken on the basis of
rumor.”
As
evidence for her thesis, Solnit takes a look at a number of disasters, from the
San Francisco earthquake of 1906 to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Also
discussed are 9/11, the Lisbon earthquake, the London Blitz during World War
Two, the Mexico City earthquake, and a few others mentioned briefly.
This
is just a basic summary. Solnit cites a LOT of primary sources for her stories,
as well as her own reporting after Katrina. (For many of us, that was our first
experience of her writing - her expose on just how badly George W. Bush, FEMA,
and Ray Nagen fucked up the response.) The details are important, particularly
the anecdotes, and I can’t really duplicate them in this post.
I
will, however, share a bunch of quotes that I think are enlightening.
First,
from the introduction, Solnit notes that most of us humans really do
long for the kind of mutual society that disaster can produce. (For those of us
who consider ourselves Christ followers, we could call this the Kingdom of
Heaven, as described by Christ.) But society is, unfortunately, set up to make
this difficult.
The positive emotions that arise in
those unpromising circumstances demonstrate that social ties and meaningful
work are deeply desired, readily improvised, and intensely rewarding. The very
structure of our economy and society prevents these goals from being achieved.
The structure is also ideological, a philosophy that best serves the wealthy
and powerful, but shapes all of our lives, reinforced as the conventional
wisdom disseminated by the media, from news hours to disaster movies. The
facets of that ideology have been called individualism, capitalism, and Social
Darwinism and have appeared in the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and
Thomas Malthus, as well as the work of most conventional contemporary
economists, who presume we seek personal gain for rational reasons and refrain
from looking at the ways a system skewed to that end damages much else we need
for our survival and well being.
This
ideology, as Solnit notes, is promulgated by the media, in service to the
powerful, who benefit from alienating us from each other.
But to understand both that rising and
what hinders and hides it, there are two other important subjects to consider.
One is the behavior of the minority in power, who often act savagely in a
disaster. The other is the beliefs and representations of the media, the people
who hold up a distorting mirror to us in which it is almost impossible to
recognize these paradises and our possibilities. Beliefs matter, and the
overlapping beliefs of the media and the elites can become a second wave of
disaster - as they did most dramatically in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina.
One of
the most powerful passages is Solnit’s view of what utopia looks like. I don’t
mean “utopia” in a derogatory sense, either. Every single advance humans have
made has been the result of dreaming of a better society. We need the utopians
more than ever these days.
The two most basic goals of social
utopias are to eliminate deprivation - hunger, ignorance, homelessness - and to
forge a society in which no one is an outsider, no one is alienated.
A
careful reading of the teachings of Christ shows this to be the vision of the
Kingdom of Heaven. We share so that no one goes without. And those on the
margins are invited to the table - indeed, they are the Kingdom. One
could also say that this is the dream of modern liberalism - taking care of
each other, and embracing everyone.
However,
not everyone shares this vision of utopia. In fact, the theofascist movement
(Christian Nationalism, White Supremacy, Patriarchy - the Fundamentalist Right
I grew up in) sees a very different ideal future.
Some religious attempts at utopia are
authoritarian, led by a charismatic leader, by elders, by rigid rules that
create outcasts, but the secular utopias have mostly been committed to liberty,
democracy, and shared power. The widespread disdain for revolution and utopia
takes as its object lesson the Soviet-style attempts at coercive utopias, in
which the original ideals of leveling and sharing go deeply awry, the
achievement critiqued in George Orwell’s Animal Farm and 1984 and
other dystopian novels. Many fail to notice that it is not the ideals, the
ends, but the coercive and authoritarian means that poison paradise.
There
is a profound truth in there. The ends never justify the means, because
the means are the ends. Coercive control and authoritarianism, whether
in the service of retrogression (as for today’s right wing) or in the service
of equality (the Soviet experience) ends up in the same bad place. And it
always creates outcasts. The means become the end - and that end is dystopian
authoritarianism. A bad tree cannot bear good fruit.
The
chapter on the “official” response to the San Francisco earthquake is
fascinating. Elite panic results in the belief that the people themselves,
rather than being victims of the disaster, are the threat to be contained.
(This is the bullshit view of human nature.) This then results in draconian
measures to “contain” potential rioters and looters. (Code word here for lower
class people, often people of color. In case that wasn’t obvious.) In San
Francisco, the army was called out, under the command of General Funston, and
given orders to shoot anyone suspected of “looting.” Probably hundreds of
people were killed, many of which, it turned out later, were trying to save
people and property from damaged buildings, not looting. Which is a slippery
term anyway. As Solnit points out, in a disaster, why shouldn’t people
take food from stores to keep everyone fed? This is requisition, not looting.
Anyway, this is a great analysis of the issues at stake.
The death penalty is an extreme measure
for theft, to say the least, and that theft was the primary crime the poster
addressed is indicative. Many would not consider property crimes significant
when lives are at stake - and the term looting conflates the emergency
requisitioning of supplies in a crisis without a cash economy with
opportunistic stealing. Disaster scholars now calls this fear-driven
overreaction elite panic.
This
is a recurring theme in the book. In a crisis, elites (and by that, she
generally means people with money and power, not educated versus uneducated)
tend to seek to protect property at the expense of people. You
see the same thing in the aftermath of Katrina.
I
wanted to mention the Halifax explosion because it is both relatively
unremembered outside of Canada, and it is also pretty dang crazy. In 1917, a
couple of ships, one laden with explosives destined for the Western Front,
collided. As in 3000 tons of explosives. As the book notes, the resulting
explosion was the largest man-made explosion before nuclear weapons.
The
six million pounds of the ship were blown a thousand feet into the air,
vaporized much of it, and rained the white-hot shrapnel over cities on both
sides of the strait. It created a wave 60 feet high. It leveled everything
within a mile radius. Absolutely crazy.
The
aftermath was notable for the way ordinary people spontaneously organized
rescue and recovery. One particular story that stood out was an unnamed nurse
who was in charge of the children’s hospital who faced down the military and
refused to move. I can see my wife doing the same thing.
This
is probably a good time to note that there is no real pattern to which
institutions became problematic in the aftermath of disaster. I have mentioned
a few cases in which the military treated civilians as a threat - that was the
bad. But under better leadership in other situations, the military can be an
incredible help at logistics - moving aid where it is needed. The key is in the
belief about whether citizens are a threat, or victims in need of
aid.
You
can see the same pattern when it comes to the police. In places like New
Orleans, they were absolutely fucking horrible, committing most of the looting
that occurred, looking the other way as vigilantes murdered black men, and
often committing murder themselves. But in other cases, again under better
leadership and working from a different paradigm, they have been helpful. The
common thread is the belief system: are people “fucking animals”? Or are they humans needing
help and support?
And
likewise, churches can be either beacons of goodness, pitching in selflessly.
Or, they can become barricades against “those people.” It is all about the
belief system.
Another
facet of the divide in belief systems is the question of mutuality versus
charity. The “charity” paradigm, very popular among the more compassionate
right wingers, is that of the “haves” being generous with charity to those in
need.
The
problem is, people prefer mutual aid to charity. And in order for mutual aid to
work, people need to have resources. In other words, they need to have control
and power over their own destinies, not charity, which always reserves the
control to the person giving it. (This may be a blog post on its own
someday.)
Altruism and charity are distinct if
not in the acts themselves at least in the surrounding atmosphere: altruism
reaches across with a sense of solidarity and empathy; charity hands down from
above. The latter always runs the risk of belittling, patronizing, or otherwise
diminishing its recipients in underscoring the difference between those who
have and those who need it. It takes away a sense of self while giving material
aid.
On a
related note, those who prefer this patronizing version of charity also tend
toward Social Darwinism in their economic policies. The sense of superiority is
the same in both cases.
This was often extrapolated into what
was later called Social Darwinism, the premise of which was that the conduct of
contemporary human beings inevitably echoed their own primordial behavior and
nature’s essential bleakness. It justified callousness toward those who lost
out in the economic struggle: they did so because they were unfit, ill adapted,
and lazy, rather than because the system was unfair - a common justification of
colonial rapacity, the deprivation of the poor, and basis for theories of
racial inferiority. They deserved it, or they were at least doomed and could
not be saved, if the forces that trampled them down were as inevitable as
nature itself.
And
this insight:
Capitalism’s fundamental premise is
scarcity, while a lot of tribal and gift economies operate on a basis of
abundance. Their generosity is both an economic and an ethical premise.
I urge
you, take a look at the teachings of Christ, and the example of the first
Christian communities, and ask yourself which they resemble: the cruelty of
capitalism and Social Darwinism? Or the mutuality of a gift economy?
Solnit
also discusses the concept of “anarchy.” This is a word whose meaning has
changed over time. Now, we tend to use it as a synonym for mayhem or chaos, but
it originally meant merely the absence of a hierarchy.
It is often used nowadays as a synonym
for mayhem, chaos, and riotous behavior because many imagine that the absence
of authority is equally the absence of order. Anarchists are idealists,
believing human beings do not need authorities and the threat of violence to
govern them but are instead capable of governing themselves by cooperation,
negotiation, and mutual aid. They stand on one side of a profound debate about
human nature and human possibility. On the other side, the authoritarian
pessimists believe that order comes only at the point of a gun or a society
stacked with prisons, guards, judges, and punishments. They believe that
somehow despite the claimed vileness of the many, the few whom they wish to
endow with power will use it justly and prudently, though the evidence for this
could most politely be called uneven. The cases drawn from disaster contradict
this belief. It is often the few in power rather than the many without who
behave viciously in disaster, and those few do so often exactly because they
subscribe to the fearful beliefs of Huxley, Le Bon, and others.
Having
grown up in a strongly authoritarian subculture, I see both the strength of the
belief, and its utter failure at every level, from the implosion of families
like mine to the mass incarceration that Americans seem to believe is necessary
for order.
Related:
for a truly imaginative portrayal of an anarchist society, check out Ursula Le
Guin’s excellent book, The Dispossessed.
I
thought that Solnit’s critique of Hobbes was interesting. It is a reminder that
a major weakness of philosophy over the millennia has been its overreliance on
males with few social ties.
What is curious for a modern
reader about the society imagined by Hobbes and then the Social Darwinists is
that it appears to consist entirely of unaffiliated men. The relationships
between lovers, spouses, parents and children, siblings, kinfolk, friends,
colleagues, and compatriots are absent, though those are clearly among the more
ancient rather than modern aspects of human life. The world they imagine looks
something like an old-fashioned business district during a working day, when
countless people venture out to do economic battle with each other. But even
those people are formed into corporations and firms whose internal cooperation
is as or more important to their functioning than external competition.
I
thought the chapter on the London Blitz was fascinating. One of Solnit’s
sources was Mollie Panter-Downs, a journalist and author - I read and posted
about her wartime short stories a few years ago -
they are definitely worth reading.
It was
out of the war that the field of disaster studies came to be. Solnit discusses
the findings of Charles Fritz, one of its pioneers. Disasters, from the
sociological perspective, look a lot different than conventional wisdom would say.
Solnit bemoans the fact that his extraordinary findings have had relatively
little effect on the bureaucrats and politicians who develop disaster response
plans. I hope that this has started to change, at least in some circles. Right
before the Covid pandemic, my wife was invited to participate in FEMA’s
disaster response training exercises, at their big facility in Alabama.
Responders from a variety of professions participated, and there did seem to be
more of an emphasis on solving problems rather than containing riots - this is
a big positive. (Also, both in the training and in the later pandemic, my wife
proved to be a real badass. You definitely want her in change in a disaster,
believe me.)
Related
to the frustration that institutions are failing to change based on evidence is
the problem of the media - particularly disaster movies, which get it so very
badly wrong. It is never the small group of elites who save the day - they are
the problem. Rather, it is the great many ordinary folk who come together and
get stuff done. We really need a change in our stories, to say the least.
So,
people pull together during disasters. But what about afterward? This is
another interesting question the book looks at. In some cases, like the Mexico
City earthquake, the disaster led to long term positive change. This can
happen. But other times, as in 9/11, the good feelings can be co-opted into
debacles like 20 years of futile war, the lost of rights through the Patriot
Act, and a paroxysm of xenophobia leading to Trump.
A disaster is as far from falling in
love as can be imagined, but disaster utopias are also a spell when engagement,
improvisation, and empathy happen as if by themselves. Then comes the hard
business of producing a good society by determination and dedication.
This
is the truth, and the work of building the Kingdom, so to speak. It is a hard
business, and requires long-term thinking and dedication. But it is worth
it.
Speaking
of the Kingdom of God/Heaven, this was mentioned in the chapter about the
aftermath of 9/11. The volunteers often used that term, whether they were
religious or not.
“This is the Kingdom, this is the
notion of everyone working and living together and eating together and pulling
for a cause - totally other-directed, totally selfless and, frankly, very
self-deprecating.”
Man,
though, the aftermath. I had forgotten about some of the details, but Solnit
mentions them. How Giuliani located the disaster headquarters right near the
World Trade Center, despite advice to avoid that area - the center was disabled
after the attacks. Predictably. Also that New Yorkers tended to hate Guilani
before, during, and after the attack. His status as a “hero” was all a media
creation. And, of course, the GW Bush administration literally changing
environmental reports to hide the risk from the toxic dust. (I was taught that
shit like this was lying, but apparently this is all fine to the American Right
Wing these days…)
And
that brings us to what ended up being GWB’s downfall: Katrina. What a total
fuck-up. And Bush was hardly the only one who deserves blame. The media was,
simply put, terrible. They led with lies and rumors that turned out to be
untrue. They claimed the city was in a chaos of a riot. It wasn’t. They claimed
that there were mass murders inside the Superdome. There weren’t. There were a
handful of people who died of natural causes. They claimed people were shooting
at the cops. They weren’t.
What
WAS true, however, was that cops were looting. There was eventually a video on
national TV of them cleaning out a WalMart. And Cadillacs were found in the
possession of cops as far away as Texas. Yeah, but rattle on about African
Americans.
And
then there is what Solnit found in investigating dozens of murders of black men
by white vigilantes. Man, that whole section is rough. There were others who
survived, who describe trying to get help, or transport supplies, only to be
met by armed white men who forced them back to flooded neighborhoods. The thing
is, one of her major sources was the bragging that these white guys did
publicly about killing blacks. And they were never prosecuted.
This
dynamic is something I noticed after living through the LA Riots. (You can read
about that in the extended footnote to my review of Nadine Gordimer’s book July’s People.)
I have made the attempt over the last 25 or so years to unlearn my subconscious
reactions from that time in my life - to recognize it as bias and racism, even
if unintentional. Unfortunately, most of my former tribe of white evangelicals
(including my parents) have gone the other direction, at least in thought and
rhetoric. Here is how Solnit looks at the phenomenon:
Like elites when they panic, racists imagine
again and again that without them utter savagery would break out, so that their
own homicidal violence is in defense of civilization and the preservation of
order. The killing rage of the Klan and lynching parties of the old South were
often triggered or fanned into flame by a story, often fictitious or
exaggerated, of a crime by an African American man. Of course there were crimes
committed by African Americans in Katrina, but to imagine that every black man
is a criminal or to punish a whole group or unconnected individuals for a crime
is racism at its most psychotic and vigilantism at its most
arrogant.
This
is how you get a Kyle Rittenhouse, or a George Zimmerman, or the guy who just
murdered a homeless man in a subway station.
Oh,
and how about this white evangelical fantasy? (As described by historian Mike
Davis, about the prior hurricane, Ivan, and the lessons not learned.)
“The evacuation of New Orleans in the
face of Hurricane Ivan looked sinisterly like Strom Thurmond’s version of the
Rapture. Affluent white people fled the Big Easy in their SUVs, while the old
and carless - mainly black - were left behind in their below-sea-level shotgun
shacks and aging tenements to face the watery wrath.”
I
don’t think it is a coincidence that the last few waves of “Rapture” obsession
came in response to social change, including the end of Jim Crow, that white
evangelicals found uncomfortable. There is a fantasy of getting to leave “those
people” behind, and watching them suffer.
I’ll
end this post with a bit from the epilogue.
Who are you? Who are we? The history of
disaster demonstrates that most of us are social animals, hungry for
connection, as well as for purpose and meaning. It also suggests that if this
is who we are, then everyday life in most places is a disaster that disruptions
sometimes give us a chance to change. They are a crack in the walls that
ordinarily hem us in, and what floods in can be enormously destructive - or
creative. Hierarchies and institutions are inadequate to these circumstances;
they are often what fails in such crises. Civil society is what succeeds, not
only in an emotional demonstration of altruism and mutual aid but also in a
practical mustering of creativity and resources to meet the challenges. Only
this dispersed force of countless people making countless decisions is adequate
to a major crisis. One reason that disasters are threatening to elites is that
power devolves to the people on the ground in many ways: it is the neighbors
who are the first responders and who assemble the impromptu kitchens and
networks to rebuild. And it demonstrates the viability of a dispersed,
decentralized system of decision making. Citizens themselves in these moments
constitute the government - the acting decision-making body - as democracy has
always promised and rarely delivered. Thus disasters often unfold as though a
revolution has already taken place.
This
book was written before Trump, so at times it can be a bit optimistic about the
direction the US is headed, but I think the core message holds true. If
anything, the Covid pandemic has shown that many people can and do pull
together in a crisis. And also that the US is deeply fractured right now, with
the Right Wing essentially engaging in constant elite panic in every crisis,
unable to see those different from them as fellow humans rather than subhuman
threats. It seems likely that we will continue to see disasters in the near
future, and thus we will have an opportunity. An opportunity to form the kinds
of communities that thrive on mutual aid and assistance. As both Solnit in this
book, and Octavia Butler in her novel, Parable of the Sower, these communities
will be diverse - a variety of races and ethnicities, national origins,
genders, sexual orientations - and in stark contrast to the vigilante elites,
who will tend to be aggressive white males - or other homogenous groups - drunk
on the fantasy of saving civilization from the savage others.
Whatever
the future holds, I am firmly on Team Mutuality, eager to build communities of
mutual support. And in a disaster, come on over, and me and mine will have food
and shelter and first aid ready to go.